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Abstract
Adversarial training has become one of the most
effective methods for improving robustness of
neural networks. However, it often suffers from
poor generalization on both clean and perturbed
data. In this paper, we propose a new algo-
rithm, named Customized Adversarial Training
(CAT), which adaptively customizes the pertur-
bation level and the corresponding label for each
training sample in adversarial training. We show
that the proposed algorithm achieves better clean
and robust accuracy than previous adversarial
training methods through extensive experiments.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have proved their effective-
ness on a variety of domains and tasks. However, it has
been found that DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2014). To enhance the robustness
of DNNs against adversarial examples, adversarial training
(Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018) has become
one of the most effective and widely used methods. Given a
pre-defined perturbation tolerance, denoted as , adversarial
training aims to minimize the robust loss, defined as the
worst-case loss within -ball around each example, leading
to a min-max optimization problem. (Madry et al., 2018)
show that applying a multi-step projected gradient descent
(PGD) attack to approximately solve the inner maximization
leads to a robust model, and several recent research has pro-
posed various ways to improve adversarial training (Zhang
et al., 2019b; Wang, 2019; Wang et al., 2019; Balaji et al.,
2019; Ding et al., 2018).
However, the standard adversarial training methods still
have a hypothetical and possibly problematic assumption:
the perturbation tolerance  is a large and fixed constant
throughout the training process, which ignores the fact that
every data point may have different intrinsic robustness.
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Intuitively, some examples are naturally closer to the de-
cision boundary, and enforcing large margin on those ex-
amples will force the classifier to give up on those exam-
ples, leading to a distorted decision surface. This intuition
may explain the known issue of the undesirable robustness-
accuracy tradeoff in adversarial robustness (Su et al., 2018;
Tsipras et al., 2019). Furthermore, with a different pertur-
bation tolerance, it is questionable whether we should still
force the model to learn to fit the one-hot label as in the orig-
inal adversarial training formulation. In the extreme case,
if an example is perturbed to the decision boundary, a good
classifier yielding the binary class prediction probabilities
should output [0.5, 0.5] instead of [1, 0]. This point becomes
crucial when each example is associated with a different
level of perturbation. Although some recent papers have
started to address the uniform  issue by treating correctly
and incorrectly classified examples differently (Ding et al.,
2018) or assigning non-uniform perturbation level (Balaji
et al., 2019), none of them have tried to incorporate the
customized training labels in this process.
Motivated by these ideas, we propose a novel Customized
Adversarial Training (CAT) framework that can substan-
tially improve the performance of adversarial training.
Throughout the adversarial training process, our algorithm
dynamically finds a non-uniform and effective perturbation
level and the corresponding customized target label for each
example. This leads to better generalization performance
and furthermore, with a careful design on adaptive  tuning,
our algorithm has only negligible computational overhead
and runs as fast as the original adversarial training algorithm.
Furthermore, we theoretically explain why the proposed
method could lead to improved generalization performance.
Our method significantly outperforms existing adversarial
training methods on the standard CIFAR-10 defense task.
With Wide-ResNet structure on CIFAR-10, under 8/255 `∞
perturbation, our method achieves 73% robust accuracy un-
der PGD attack and 71% robust accuracy under Carlini and
Wagner (C&W) attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), while the
current best model only achieves 58.6% under PGD attack
and 56.8% under C&W attack. Furthermore, our method
only degrades the clean accuracy from 95.93% (standard
test accuracy) to 93.48%, while other adversarial training
methods have clean accuracy below 91.34%.
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2. Related Work
Adversarial attack. Finding adversarial examples, also
known as adversarial attacks, can be formulated as an op-
timization problem — the goal is to find the perturbation
δ to maximize the (robust) loss, while constraining δ to
have small norm (e.g., `p norm). Therefore gradient-based
algorithms have been widely used, such as fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015), C&W at-
tack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) and PGD attack (Madry et al.,
2018). In addition to white-box attacks, it has been also
found that adversarial attacks can be generated also in the
soft-label black box setting (Chen et al., 2017; Ilyas et al.,
2018) and hard-label black box setting (Brendel et al., 2017;
Cheng et al., 2018; 2020), and with similar quality to white-
box attacks. Moreover, physical attacks have been proposed
to generate adversarial examples in the real world (Eykholt
et al., 2018). Therefore, with the existence of these powerful
adversarial attacks, how to enhance the robustness of neural
network models has become an important issue in many real
world applications.
Adversarial training. To enhance the adversarial robust-
ness of a neural network model, a natural idea is to itera-
tively generate adversarial examples, add them back to the
training data, and retrain the model. For example, Good-
fellow et al. (2015) use adversarial examples generated by
FGSM to augment the data, and Kurakin et al. (2017) pro-
pose to use a multiple-step FGSM to further improve the
performance. Madry et al. (2018) show that adversarial
training can be formulated as a min-max optimization prob-
lem, and propose to use PGD attack (similar to multi-step
FGSM) to find adversarial examples for each batch. The
resulting method achieves notable successes and can sur-
vive even under strong attacks (Athalye et al., 2018). After
that, many defense algorithms are based on a similar min-
max framework. Zhang et al. (2019b) propose TRADES,
a theoretically-driven upper bound minimization algorithm
to achieve the top-1 rank in NeurIPS 2018 defense compe-
tition. Recently, Ding et al. (2018) notice the importance
of misclassified examples and treat correctly classified and
misclassified examples differently. Wang (2020) use label
prediction probability as a smooth way to combine correctly
and misclassified samples. Other than just adding adversar-
ial examples into the training process, Wang (2019) find that
it is also effective to find the “adversarial label” along with
the “adversarial perturbation”. The convergence of adver-
sarial training has also been studied (Gao et al., 2019; Wang
et al., 2019). Recently, to reduce the computational over-
head brought by adversarial training, several works have
been proposed (Shafahi et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019a;
Wong et al., 2020). It is widely recognized that the current
defensive models are still not ideal and have considerable
room for improvement. Moreover, to make robust models
useful in practice, it is crucial that both clean and robust
error need to be further enhanced.
Other adversarial defenses In addition to adversarial
training based methods, a wide range of defense methods
have been proposed such as Gaussian data augmentation
(Zantedeschi et al., 2017), randomized smoothing (Liu et al.,
2018; Cohen et al., 2019), Mixup (Zhang et al., 2018) and its
variants (Thulasidasan et al., 2019; Verma et al., 2018), and
Label smoothing (Shafahi et al., 2018; Goibert & Dohmatob,
2019). Shafahi et al. (2018) find that it could achieve similar
robust accuracy with adversarial training when combining
Gaussian data augmentation and label-smoothing.
However, some of the aforementioned methods have been
shown to cause obfuscated gradients instead of enhanced
robustness (Athalye et al., 2018), while adversarial training
based methods are still shown to be robust under different
kinds of adversarial attacks.
3. Proposed Method
3.1. Preliminaries
Adversarial training can be formulated as a min-max opti-
mization problem. For a K-class classification problem, let
D = {(xi, yi)}i=1,...,n denote the set of training samples
in the dataset with xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K} =: [K]. Let
fθ(x) : Rd → [K] denote a classification model parameter-
ized by θ. We denote by hθ(x) : Rd → [0, 1]K as the predic-
tion output for each class, i.e., fθ(x) = argmaxi[hθ(x)]i.
We use standard O(·) notation to hide universal constant
factor, and a . b to indicate a = O(b).
Adversarial training can be formulated as:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B(xi,)
`(fθ(x
′
i), yi), (1)
where B(xi, ) denotes the `p-norm ball centered at xi with
radius . The inner maximization problem aims to find an
adversarial version of a given data point xi that achieves
a high loss. In general one can define B(xi, ) based on
the threat model, but the `∞ ball is the most popular choice
adopted by recent works (Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al.,
2019b; Wang, 2019; Ding et al., 2018; Wang, 2020), which
will also be used in this paper. For a deep neural network
model, the inner maximization does not have a closed form
solution, so adversarial training methods typically use a
gradient-based iterative solver to approximately solve the
inner problem. The most commonly used choice is the multi-
step PGD (Madry et al., 2018) and C&W attack (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017).
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(b) Adv-train with  = 1
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(d) CAT (ours) with max = 4
Figure 1. Different training methods on a linearly separable binary classification dataset with 1.75 margin for both classes. Adversarial
training with small  works fine, but for a large  beyond the true margin, adversarial training would ruin the classifier’s classification
performance, while our proposed adaptive customized adversarial training method still keeps a good generalization performance.
3.2. Motivation
Intuitively, if adversarial training can always find a model
with close-to-zero robust error, one should always use a
large  for training because it will automatically imply ro-
bustness to any smaller . Unfortunately, in practice a uni-
formly large  is often harmful. In the following we em-
pirically explain this problem and use it to motivate our
proposed algorithm.
We use a simple linear classification case to demonstrate
why a uniformly large  is harmful. In Figure 1a, we gener-
ate a synthetic linearly separable dataset with the margin set
to be 1.75 for both classes, and the correct linear boundary
can be easily obtained by standard training. In Figure 1b,
we run adversarial training with  = 1, and since this 
is smaller than the margin, the algorithm can still obtain
near-optimal results. However, when we use a large  = 4
for adversarial training in Figure 1c, the resulting decision
boundary becomes significantly worse. It is because adver-
sarial training cannot correctly fit all the samples with a
margin up to 4, so it will sacrifice some data samples, lead-
ing to distorted and undesirable decision boundary. This
motivates the following two problems:
• We shouldn’t set the same large  uniformly for all
samples. Some samples are intrinsically closer to the
decision boundary and they should use a smaller .
Without doing this, adversarial training will give up
on those samples, which leads to worse training and
generalization error (see more discussions in Section
3.5 on the generalization bounds).
• The adversarial training loss is trying to force the pre-
diction to match the one-hot label (e.g., [1, 0] in the
binary classification case) even after large perturba-
tions. However, if a sample is perturbed, the prediction
shouldn’t remain one-hot. For instance, if a sample is
perturbed to the decision boundary, the prediction of
a perfect model should be [0.5, 0.5] instead of [1, 0].
This also makes adversarial training fail to recover a
good decision hyperplane.
Furthermore, we observe that even if adversarial training can
obtain close-to-zero training error with large  (e.g., (Gao
et al., 2019) proves that this will happen for overparameter-
ized network with large-enough margin), a uniformly large 
will lead to larger generalization gap. This could be partially
explained by the theoretical results provided by (Yin et al.,
2018), which shows that the adversarial Rademacher com-
plexity has a lower bound with an explicit dependence on
the perturbation tolerance. The empirical results in Table 1
also illustrate this problem. When conducting adversarial
training with  = 0.3 on CIFAR10 VGG-16, we found that
the model achieves close-to-zero robust training error on all
 ≤ 0.3, but it suffers larger generalization gap compared
to training with smaller . This also demonstrates that a
uniformly large  is harmful even when it achieves perfect
training error.
Table 1. The influence of different fixed  values used in adversarial
training on the robust accuracy with  = 0.01.
Testing  Error Type Training 0.01 0.02 0.03
0.01 Train 99.96% 99.99% 99.16%Test 69.79% 69.06% 66.04%
CAT (Customized Adversarial Training) We propose
the Customized Adversarial Training (CAT) framework
that improves adversarial training by addressing the above-
mentioned problems. First, our algorithm has an auto-tuning
 method to customize the  used for each training example.
Second, instead of forcing the model to fit the original la-
bel, we customize the target label for each example based
on its own . In the following we will describe these two
components in more detail.
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3.3. Auto-tuning  for adversarial training
The first component of our algorithm is an auto-tuning 
tuning method which adaptively assigns a suitable  for each
sample during the adversarial training procedure. Let i be
the perturbation level assigned to example i. Based on the
intuition mentioned in Section 3.2, we do not want to further
increase  if we find the classifier does not have capacity to
robustly classify the example, which means we should set
i = argmin

{ max
x′i∈B(xi,)
fθ(x
′
i) 6= yi} (2)
and the adversarial training objective becomes
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B(xi,i)
`(fθ(x
′
i), yi). (3)
Note that i in (2) depends on θ while θ in (3) also depends
on i. We thus propose to conduct alternative updates —
conducting one SGD update on θ, and then update the i
in the current batch. However, finding i exactly requires
brute-force search for every possible value, which adds
significant computational overhead to adversarial training.
Therefore, we only conduct a simplified update rule on i
as follows. Starting from an initial perturbation level of
zero, at each iteration we conduct adversarial attack (e.g.,
PGD attack) with perturbation tolerance i + η where η is
a constant. If the attack is successful, then we keep the
current i, while if the attack is unsuccessful, which means
an attacker still cannot find an adversarial example that
satisfies maxx′i∈B(xi,i+η) fθ(x
′
i) 6= yi, then we increase
i = i + η. The attack results will also be used to update
the model parameter θ, so this adaptive scheme does not
require any additional cost. In practice, we also have an
upper bound on the final perturbation to make sure each
individual i will not be too large.
3.4. Adaptive label uncertainty for adversarial training
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the standard adversarial train-
ing loss is trying to enforce a sample being classified as
the original one-hot label after  perturbation. However,
this may not be ideal. In the extreme case, if a sample is
perturbed to the decision boundary, the prediction must be
far away from one-hot. This problem is more severe when
using non-uniform i, since each different i will introduce
a different bias to the loss, and that may be one of the rea-
sons that purely adaptive -scheduling does not work well
(see our ablation study in Section 4.4 and also the results
reported in (Balaji et al., 2019)).
In the following, we propose an adaptive label smoothing
approach to reflect different perturbation tolerance on each
example. Szegedy et al. (2016) introduced label smooth-
ing that converts one-hot label vectors into one-warm vec-
tors representing low-confidence classification, in order to
prevent the model from making over-confident predictions.
Specifically, with a one-hot encoded label y, the smoothed
version is
y˜ = (1− α)y + αu
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the hyperparameter to control the
smoothing level. In the adaptive setting, we set α = c∗ i so
that a larger perturbation tolerance would receive a higher
label uncertainty and c is a hyperparameter. A common
choice of u is the uniform distribution u = 1K . To further
prevent over-fitting and improve the generalization, we use
u = Dirichlet(1) where Dirichlet(·) refers to the Dirichlet
distribution and 1 ∈ RK is an all one vector. With dif-
ferent perturbation tolerance, the adaptive version of label
smoothing is
y˜i = (1− ci)yi + ciDirichlet(1). (4)
The final objective function: Combining the two afore-
mentioned two main techniques, our Customized Adver-
sarial Training (CAT) method attempts to minimize the
following objective:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B(xi,i)
`(fθ(x
′
i), y˜i)
s.t. i = argmin

{ max
x′i∈B(xi,)
fθ(x
′
i) 6= yi}
(5)
where y˜i is defined in (4). As described in Section 3.3, we
approximately minimize this objective with an alternative
update scheme, which encounters almost no additional cost
compared to the original adversarial training algorithm. The
detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Choice of loss function. In general, our framework can
be used with any loss function `(·). In the previous works,
cross entropy loss is commonly used for `. However, the
model trained by smoothing techniques tends to have better
performance against PGD attack than C&W∞ attack (see
the VGG experiments in Figure 2. So in addition to testing
our algorithm under cross entropy loss, we also propose
a mixed loss to enhance the defense performance towards
C&W∞ attack. That is,
CE(xi, y˜i) + max{[max
i 6=y0
[Z(x)]i − [Z(x)]y0 ,−κ}, (6)
where Z(x) ∈ RK is the final (logit) layer output, and
[Z(x)]i is the prediction score for the i-th class and y0
is the original label. The parameter κ encourages to find
an adversary that will not classified as class y0 with high
confidence.
3.5. Theoretical Analysis
To better understand how our scheme improves generaliza-
tion, we provide some theoretical analysis. Recall we denote
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Algorithm 1 CAT algorithm
Input: Training dataset (X,Y ), cross entropy loss or
mix loss `, scheduling parameter η, weighting factor c,
perturbation upperbound max
Initial every sample’s i with 0
for epoch=1, . . . , N do
for i=1, . . . , B do
y˜i ← (1− ci)yi + (1− ci)Dirichlet(1)
i ← i + η
δi ← 0
for j = 1 . . .m do
δi ← δi + α · sign(∇δ`(fθ(xi + δi), y˜i)
δi ← max(min(δi, i),−i)
end for
if fθ(xi + δi) 6= yi then
i ← i − η
end if
i ← min(max, i)
y˜i ← (1− ci)yi + (1− ci)Dirichlet(1)
θ ← θ − γθ∇θ`(fθ(xi + δi), y˜i)
end for
end for
return θ
by hθ(x) : Rd → [0, 1]K as the prediction probability for
the K classes. We define the bilateral margin that our paper
is essentially maximizing over as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Bilateral margin) We define the bilateral
perturbed network output by Hθ(x, δi, δo):
Hθ(x, δ
i, δo) := hθ
(
x+ δi‖x‖)+ δo ∥∥x+ δi‖x‖∥∥ .
The bilateral margin is now defined as the minimum norm
of (δi, δo) required to cause the classifier to make false
predictions:
mF (x, y) := min
δi,δo
√
‖δi‖2 + ‖δo‖2
subject to max
y′
Hθ(x, δ
i, δo)y′ 6= y.
(7)
This margin captures both the relative perturbation on the
input layer δi and on the soft-max output δo.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose the parameter space Θ we optimize
over has covering number that scales as logN‖·‖op(η,Θ) ≤
bC2/η2c for some complexity C. Then with probability 1− δ
over the draw of the training data, any classifer fθ, θ ∈ Θ
which achieves training error 0 satisfies:
E[fθ(x) = y] .
C log2 n√
n
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1
mF (xi, yi)
+ ζ,
where ζ is of small order O
(
1
n log(1/δ)
)
.
We defer the proof to the Appendix, which is adapted from
Theorem 2.1 of (Wei & Ma, 2019). We observe the pop-
ulation risk is bounded by two key factors, the average
of 1mF (xi,yi) and C, the covering number of the parameter
space. On one side, the average of 1mF (xi,yi) is dominated
by the samples with the smallest margin. Therefore when
we do adversarial training, it is important that we not only
achieve higher overall accuracy, but also make sure the
samples closer to the decision boundary have large enough
margin. This can not be achieved by simply using constant
and large  that will maintain a large margin for most sam-
ples but sacrifice the accuracy of a small portion of data.
On the other hand, the covering number of the network’s
parameter space can be roughly captured by a bound of
product of all layers’ weight norms. We hypothesize that
with more flexibility in choosing , our algorithm will con-
verge faster than using larger constant  and will have more
implicit regularization effect. To testify this hypothesis, we
roughly measure the model complexity C by the product
of the weight norms of different models. In comparison to
our model, when training with constant  = 0.01, 0.02 and
0.03, it respectively yields C as large as 2.54, 3.53 and 1.39
times of that of our model, which means our model indeed
has more implicit regularization effect among others.
3.6. Connections with other training methods
Many recent papers attempt to improve adversarial training.
Although they all follow the similar min-max framework,
each of them uses slightly different loss functions. We
summarize the loss functions used by recent adversarial
training methods in Table 2.
We see that except for natural training which directly min-
imizes the cross entropy loss (denoted as CE), all train-
ing techniques involve the use of the min-max framework.
TRADES and MMA use the unperturbed data’s cross en-
tropy loss as an additional regularization term to achieve a
better trade-off between clean and robust error.
Similar to our method, both MMA and IAAT have sample-
wise adaptive  during training. They also utilize the adap-
tive  to find the largest possible i for every sample xi.
However, they do not consider the adaptive label technique
mentioned in Section 3.4. As a result, they can only achieve
better clean accuracy while the improvements in robust ac-
curacy is limited. Our CAT-CE algorithm (CAT with CE
loss) is more general than IAAT and MMA. CAT-CE reduce
to IAAT when we set c = 0 in adaptive label smoothing.
Moreover, MMA could be treated as a special case of CAT-
CE when we use a line search scheme to find the i and
c = 0. Also, in Section 4.4, we will show the importance of
the adaptive label uncertainty step in CAT.
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Table 2. Summary of several robust training methods amd their corresponding loss function. Dirichlet(b) indicates the Dirichlet
distribution parameterized by b.
Methods Loss Function
Natural CE(fθ(x), y)
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) maxx′∈B(x,) CE(fθ(x′), y)
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) CE(fθ(x), y) + maxx′∈B(x,) KL(fθ(x′), fθ(x))
Bilateral Adv Training (Wang, 2019) maxx′∈B(x,),y′∈∆ CE(fθ(x′), y′)
MMA (Ding et al., 2018) CE(fθ(x))1(fθ(x) 6= y) + (maxx′∈B(x,) CE(fθ(x′), y))1(fθ(x) = y)
MART (Wang, 2020) maxx′∈B(x,) BCE(fθ(x′), y) + KL(fθ(x′), fθ(x)) · (1− fθ(x))
IAAT (Balaji et al., 2019) maxx′i∈B(xi,i) CE(fθ(x
′
i), yi)
CAT-CE (ours) maxx′i∈B(xi,i) CE(fθ(x
′
i), (1− ci)yi + ciDirichlet(1))
CAT-MIX (ours) maxx′i∈B(xi,i) CE(x
′
i, (1− ci)yi + ciDirichlet(1)) + maxj 6=y0 [Z(x′i)]j − [Z(x′i)]y0
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to show
that CAT achieves a strong result on both clean and robust
accuracy. We include the following methods into our com-
parison:
• Customized Adversarial Training (CAT-CE): Our pro-
posed method with the cross entropy loss.
• Customized Adversarial Training (CAT-MIX): Our pro-
posed method with the mixed cross entropy loss (6).
• Adversarial training: The adversarial training method
proposed in (Madry et al., 2018) where they use a
K-step PGD attack as adversary.
• TRADES: TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) improves
adversarial training by an additional loss on the clean
examples and achieves the state-of-art performance on
robust accuracy.
• Natural: the natural training which only minimizes the
cross entropy loss.
Furthermore, since many recently proposed adversarial train-
ing methods have considered CIFAR-10 with Wide-ResNet
structure as the standard setting and report their numbers,
we also compare our performance with 7 previous methods
on this specific setting.
4.1. Experimental Setup
Dataset and model structure. We use two popular
dataset CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al.) and Restricted-
ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) for performance evalua-
tion. For CIFAR-10, we use both standard VGG-16 (Si-
monyan & Zisserman, 2015) and Wide ResNet that is used
in both vanilla adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018)
and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b). For VGG-16, we
implement adversarial training with the standard hyper-
parameters and train TRADES with the official implementa-
tion. For Wide ResNet, since the model has become stan-
dard for testing adversarial training methods, we use exactly
the same model structure provided by (Madry et al., 2018;
Zhang et al., 2019b). And use the models’ checkpoint re-
leased by adversarial training and TRADES official reposi-
tory and implement the Madry’s adversarial training using
the standard hyper-parameters. For Restricted-ImageNet,
we use ResNet-50. All our experiments were implemented
in Pytorch-1.4 and conducted using dual Intel E5-2640 v4
CPUs (2.40GHz) with 512 GB memory with a GTX 2080
TI GPU.
Implementation details. We set the number of iterations
in adversarial attack to be 10 for all methods. Adversarial
training and TRADES are trained on PGD attacks setting
 = 8/255 with cross entropy loss (CE). We implement
our CAT method both on cross entropy (CE) (Madry et al.,
2018) and C&W loss (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), and set
max = 8/255. All the models are trained using SGD with
momentum 0.9, weight decay 5× 10−4. For VGG-16/Wide
ResNet models, we use the initial learning rate of 0.01/0.1,
and we decay the learning rate by 90% at the 80th, 140th,
and 180th epoch. For CAT, we set epsilon scheduling param-
eter η = 0.005, max = 8/255 and weighting parameter
c = 10. For CAT-MIX, we set κ = 10.
4.2. Robustness Evaluation and Analysis
White-box attcks. For CIFAR10, we evaluate all the mod-
els under different tolerance of white-box `∞-norm bounded
non-targeted PGD and C&W attack. Specifically, we use
both PGD20 (20-step PGD with step size /5) and C&W∞.
All attacks are equipped with random-start. To be noted,
when  = 0, the robust accuracy is reduced to test accuracy
of unperturbed (natural) test samples, i.e clean accuracy.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 2, where we
can easily see that both CAT-CE and CAT-MIX clearly
outperform other methods among  from 0 to 0.07. So
our methods can achieve better robust error at the standard
8/255 perturbation threshold considered in the literature,
and also has better clean accuracy ( = 0). The accuracy
curve becomes quite flat when  is increased.
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Figure 2. Robust accuracy under different levels of attacks on CIFAR-10 dataset with VGG and Wide-ResNet architectures. CAT-CE and
CAT-MIX clearly outperform TREADS and adversarial training.
Table 3. The clean and robust accuracy of Wide Resnet models trained by various defense methods. All robust accuracy results use
 = 8/255 `∞ ball. We reported the best performance listed in the papers. (∗) denotes random-restart is applied in the testing attack. (X)
denotes it use a X-step PGD attack
Methods Clean accuracy PGD accuracy C&W accuracy
Natural training 95.93% 0% 0%
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) 87.30% 52.68% 50.73%
Dynamic adversarial training (Wang et al., 2019) 84.51% 55.03% 51.98%
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) 84.22% 56.40%(20) 51.98%
Bilateral Adv Training (Wang, 2019) 91.00% 57.5%(∗20) 56.2%(∗20)
MMA (Ding et al., 2018) 84.36% 47.18% 7
MART (Wang, 2020) 84.17% 58.56%(20) 54.58%
IAAT (Balaji et al., 2019) 91.34% 48.53%(∗10) 56.80%
CAT-CE (ours) 93.48% 73.38%(∗20) 61.88%(∗20)
CAT-MIX (ours) 89.61% 73.16%(∗20) 71.67%(∗20)
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Figure 3. Loss landscape comparison of different adversarial training methods
CAT: Customized Adversarial Training for Improved Robustness
Wide ResNet has become a standard structure for comparing
adversarial training methods, and it’s standard to train and
evaluate with 8/255 `∞ norm perturbation. For this setting,
we collect the reported accuracy from 7 other adversarial
training methods, with several of them published very re-
cently, to have a detailed full comparison. As shown in
Table 3, our method achieves state-of-art robust accuracy
while maintaining a high clean accuracy. Due to the page
limit, we put the Restricted ImageNet result in the appendix.
Black-box transfer attacks. We follow the criterion of
evaluating transfer attacks as suggested by Athalye et al.
(2018) to inspect whether the models trained by CAT will
cause the issue of obfuscated gradients and give a false
sense of model robustness. We generate 10,000 adversarial
examples of CIFAR-10 from natural models with  = 0.03
and evaluate their attack performance on the target model.
Table 4 shows that CAT achieves the best accuracy com-
pared with adversarial training and TRADES, suggesting
the effectiveness of CAT in defending both white-box and
transfer attacks.
Table 4. Robust accuracy under transfer attack on CIFAR-10
Method VGG 16 Wide ResNet
Adv train 79.13% 85.84%
TRADES 83.53% 83.90%
CAT 86.58% 88.66 %
4.3. Loss Landscape Exploration
To further verify the superior robustness using CAT, we
visualize the loss landscape of different training methods
in Figure 3. Following the implementation in (Engstrom
et al., 2018), we divide the data input along a linear space
grid defined by the sign of the input gradient and a random
Rademacher vector, where the x- and y- axes represent the
magnitude of the perturbation added in each direction and
the z-axis represents the loss.
As shown in Figure 3, CAT generates a model with a lower
and smoother loss landscape. Also, it could be taken as
another strong evidence that we have found a robust model
through CAT training.
4.4. Ablation study
The importance of adaptive label uncertainty. Here we
discuss and perform an ablation study using VGG-16 and
CIFAR-10 on the importance of adaptive label uncertainty
and adaptive instance-wise . In Figure 4b, Adp train de-
notes the original adversarial training, Adv+LS denotes
adversarial training with label smoothing (setting y by
Eq (4)), Adp-Adv denotes adversarial training with adap-
tive instance-wise , and CAT-CE is the proposed method
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Figure 4. Analysis of CAT. In (a) we test CAT under different steps
of PGD attack, and in (b) we conduct an ablation study on CAT by
changing the loss function and removing Label Adaption (LA).
which is a combination of these two tricks. We found that
only applying adaptive instance-wise  or label smoothing
cannot significantly boost the robust accuracy over standard
adversarial training, but the proposed method, by nicely
combining these two ideas, can significantly improve the
performance. This explains why CAT significantly outper-
forms some instance adaptive  methods like IAAT and
MMA.
More iterations of PGD attack. As suggested in Atha-
lye et al. (2018), to verify that the performance gain is not
brought by insufficient iterations in PGD attack, in Figure
4a, we show the robust accuracy with the number of iter-
ation varying from 10 to 500 on CIFAR10 VGG16. The
results show that although increasing the number of itera-
tions would decrease the performance by around 2%, CAT
always outperforms other methods significantly.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose CAT, a customized adversarial
training method that is designed to have better generaliza-
tion for both clean and robust performance. We also provide
CAT: Customized Adversarial Training for Improved Robustness
a theoretical analysis to motivate our algorithm. Experimen-
tal results show that CAT has achieved state-of-art robust
accuracy and a high clean accuracy while keeping similar
running time as standard adversarial training. The success of
CAT indicates that it is crucial to customize the perturbation
level on both data sample side and its label in adversarial
training.
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A. Omitted Proofs
In this section we provide the omitted proof for Theorem 3.2, which is adapted from Theorem 2.1 from (Wei & Ma, 2019).
They defined the all layer margin for a k-layer network hθ(x) = fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · f1(x) and perturbation δ = (δ1, δ2, · · · δk)
as follows:
h1(x, δ) =f1(x) + δ1‖x‖2
hi(x, δ) =fi(hi−1(x, δ)) + δi‖hi−1(x, δ)‖2
Hθ(x, δ) =hk(x, δ).
They define the all-layer margin as the minimum norm of δ = (δi)ki=1 required that causes the classifier to make a false
prediction.
mF (x, y) := min
δi,δo
√
‖δi‖2 + ‖δo‖2
subject to max
y′
Hθ(x, δ
i, δo)y′ 6= y.
(8)
They consider the function class F = {fk ◦ fk−1 · · · ◦ f1 : fi ∈ Fi} be the class of compositions of functions from function
classes F1, · · · Fk. They achieve the generalization bound as follows:
Theorem A.1 (Theorem 2.1 from (Wei & Ma, 2019)) In the above setting, with probability 1 − δ over the draw of the
data, all classifiers F ∈ F which achieve training error 0 satisfy
E[fθ(x) = y] .
∑
i Ci log2 n√
n
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1
mF (xi, yi)
+ ζ,
where ζ is of small order O
(
1
n log(1/δ)
)
.
For our problem, we define hθ(x) := f2 ◦ f1(x), where f1 is identity mapping, and f2 is the original function hθ. Therefore
the all layer margin is reduced to our bilateral margin:
h1(x, δ
i) =f1(x) + δ
i‖x‖2 = x+ δi‖x‖
Hθ(x, δ) = h2(x, δ
i, δo) =f2(h1(x, δ
i)) + δo‖h1(x, δi)‖
=hθ(x+ δ
i‖x‖) + δo‖x+ δi‖x‖‖.
Next, notice since f1 is identity mapping, and composition with hθ doesn’t affect the overall complexity. We apply Theorem
A.1 and get our result.
